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We are grateful to Professor Morice for his reminder of the limits of observational data, and the 
need for caution in its interpretation[1]. And we accept that it is unlikely to ever be proved 
conclusively that the dramatic restrictions imposed as countries locked down caused the dramatic 
changes in epidemic trajectories, even though the epidemiological changes seemed to follow the 
behavioural changes. However, there is also a large logical leap from observing the Swedish data to 
inferring that social distancing “measures can only have had a minor effect”. 
The decisions of the Swedish government certainly differed from those of other countries. The 
Swedish decline in daily mortalities was also slower than in the rest of Europe, including the UK. It is 
true that that those extra deaths cannot be conclusively proved to be the responsibility of the public 
health policy of the Swedish government. However, Sweden isn’t isolated. The natural comparators 
for the Swedish experience are its neighbours: Denmark, Norway, and Finland. All of them 
experienced far lower, and more rapidly declining, mortality rates. Many Swedish people modified 
their behaviour substantially, following and even exceeding governmental recommendations that 
resembled many of the restrictions imposed in other countries.[2] 
The United States is another western country that did not follow the pattern of locking down tightly. 
And its patchwork of decisions and timings may be the nearest data we will have to trials of the 
effects of different measures. But even they cannot prove causation. 
So there remain at least four possibilities: the lockdowns changed the course of the epidemic; the 
epidemic was halted by behavioural changes that would have occurred without the governmental 
lockdown (effectively a people’s lockdown); spring reduced transmission sufficiently to stop the virus 
around the time of each European country’s lockdown; or, in each country, changes occurred in the 
virus around the time of lockdown. Until next winter, choosing between them will largely be a 
matter of belief, though it is unclear how an argument for the centrality of seasonality would explain 
the apparent successes of autumnal control measures in Australia and New Zealand.. 
One response to this uncertainty would be to give up on statistical analysis and modelling, and fall 
back on common sense to deal with this unprecedented situation. Some instincts, such as those to 
avoid crowds of strangers and individuals who show signs of sickness, are certainly appropriate for 
personal safety within a pandemic, but it is not obvious how they would inform decisions on 
purchasing ventilators or creating extra hospital capacity. And, while the Nightingale Hospitals may 
feel like wasted money now, they were an insurance policy. Regretting the purchase of insurance 
because we didn’t need to make a claim rather misses its point. 
While we agree with Professor Morice about the importance of assumptions, we do believe models 
can extract useful information from, even limited, data. We failed if our models [3] were 
“indecipherable”. They were very simple in concept: directly transmissible diseases spread 
exponentially while they are rare and other conditions are constant. The proportion of the 
population that caught COVID-19 was relatively small, and the main methodological novelty in our 
paper was estimating exponential rates of decline after each country’s peak as well as exponential 
growth rates before it. Separate models were fitted for each country, partly because, as Professor 
Morice says, their “surety of data collection varies”. 
And we also agree that all, certainly including our, model results need to be treated with caution: 
they are simplified representations rather than reality. It wasn’t hubris that led us to say our 
“estimates are incompatible with a return to previous activities post lockdown”, but a recognition 
that they were estimates rather than definitive truth.  
There is one issue that we clearly missed: while the change from rapid increases to slow declines 
does suggest that the behavioural changes were only just sufficient, as we stated, we didn’t 
acknowledge that some of the restrictions might have absolutely no effect. So, if banning sunbathing 
in parks, or restricting people to one one-hour period of exercise per day, made no difference to 
disease transmission they were irrelevant. We should have clearly stated that it was a majority out 
of those behavioural changes that affected disease transmission that required continuation. Working 
out which these were effective will be difficult, especially as people are responding in very different 
ways to the easing of restrictions. Without data, statistical analysis, and, probably, modelling we are 
unlikely to be able to untangle those effects. And the argument as to whether it is better to do too 
much or too little about a public health crisis is unanswerable in the abstract: gradually, as 
information becomes available and is analysed, we can hope to tune the distribution of resources 
between COVID-19 and other priorities. But, whatever happens, we will remain grateful to Professor 
Morice for his contribution to keeping us honest. 
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